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Symposium
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A HISTORICAL SYMPOSIUM
The following three articles examine the effect of
United States Supreme Court decisions upon American
government during three distinct historical periods. In the
first of these articles, a distinguished political scientist dis-
cusses the role of the Supreme Court as an instrument of
the forging process by which American federalism was at-
tained prior to the Civil War. In the second article, which
covers the intermediate period between the Civil War and
the Great Depression, America's most noted jurist analyzes
the continued development of a responsible government of
law as controlled by the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General of the United States, in the concluding article,
details the short but fascinating history of the Court during
the New Deal era. The Nebraska Law Review is indebted
to the Institute for Public Affairs of the University of Oma-
ha for the opportunity to publish this interesting collection.
-The Editors
The Supreme Court and The Forging
of Federalism: 1789-1864*
Dr. Carl B. Swisher**
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a far cry back to the establishment of the American con-
stitutional system, a system set up for thirteen isolated, thinly
populated, and largely primitive agricultural states. Yet because
*Presented at the Institute for Public Affairs, University of Omaha,
Omaha, Nebraska, March 9, 1960.
**A.B., 1926, A.M., 1927, Pomona College; Ph.D., 1929, Brookings Graduate
School. Chairman of the Department and Professor of Political Science,
The Johns Hopkins University.
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of, as well as in spite of, the vast changes which have occurred
since that time, we can better understand our American heritage
if we return from time to time to look at the conditions of our
ancestry.
Unlike Congress and the various executive offices, which
existed in some form before the Constitution was drafted, the
Supreme Court was the creation of the Constitution itself. Its
purpose was to bring to the newly organized government an in-
strument for enforcing the rule of law. It was to enforce as the
supreme law of the land, the federal Constitution, statutes, and
treaties. It was to subordinate the constitutions and statutes of
the states to the supreme law, the end being that we should live
as one nation and not merely as an aggregation of lesser sover-
eignties. At the time of the Revolution the states were held to-
gether by little more than a common determination that they would
no longer be ruled by the mother country. A common hate can
bring temporary unity and cooperation but it offers no guarantee
of survival of togetherness. Our pattern of federal relations was
the product of a forging process; it had to be forged not merely
by the traumatic experience of the Revolution but also in the
crucible of continuing struggle after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, with the Supreme Court as one of the major instruments of
the forging process.
II. THE MARSHALL ERA
In this short article it is necessary to leave largely unmentioned
the work of the Supreme Court in its first decade, that of the 1790's,
and go to that period of Chief Justice John Marshall's dynamic
leadership after the turn of the century. During the 1790's there
were sporadic significant decisions with respect to federalism, but
perhaps even more important was the negative action of the Court
in refusing to act other than as a court; in refusing to act officially
as an adviser to the government except as it could do so in the
decision of actual cases or controversies. It limited itself to its own
appropriate field of action. Herein was to lie much of its strength:
it was to speak only within the discipline of adversary proceedings,
and was to speak not in the name of politics but only in the name
of the law. In doing so it appealed to the deep instinct for order
then felt by the American people, and felt even to this day. The
Court limited itself to judicial action-to deciding cases according
to law. During its first decade the Court established itself well
within this judicial groove.
When, near the close of his adminstration, he selected John
Marshall of Virginia for the Chief Justiceship, President John
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Adams showed no sign of awareness that he was determining the
course of American constitutional development for a long time to
come. His first choice was John Jay, who had been the first Chief
Justice, but who, disliking the circuit riding which was then re-
quired of Supreme Court justices and, perhaps, failing to see the
potentialities of his judicial office, had resigned from the Court
to become governor of New York. When Jay declined reappoint-
ment, Adams turned to Marshall who for a brief period had been
serving as his Secretary of State and who held firmly to the prin-
ciples of federalism which were, at the time when Thomas Jeffer-
son was about to enter the presidency, very much out of style.
John Marshall became a great Chief Justice not by virtue of
great learning in the law, although for a lawyer of his times he
showed no want of preparation, but by virtue of other qualities.
He had an unswerving conviction as to the need for preserving and
strengthening the American Union. He had a fine sense of strategy
in human relations and great skill in implanting his own ideas in
the minds of other men and making them acceptable. Beyond the
point of his personal qualifications, he had the good fortune to be
appointed to the office at a time of greatest challenge. The Su-
preme Court, indeed the federal judiciary as a whole, was on the
defensive with respect to Congress and the new President. Al-
though the federal courts were courts of law and not instruments
of partisan politics, it was obvious that the federal judges were
Federalists in origin, sentiments, and associations. With the power
of impeachment in the hands of a Jeffersonian Republican Congress,
it was clear that the judiciary would have to be most circumspect
if it was not to suffer for its Federalism.
It was under these circumstances that Marshall developed as
a master strategist. He persuaded his brethren to abandon their
decade of seriatum opinions in which the justices spoke, not through
an official opinion of the Court, but with separate opinions even
when arriving at the same final decision. Under the old procedure
the justices often sounded more like differing members of Congress
than like an impersonal tribunal speaking only in the name of the
law. From the beginning of the Marshall regime, however, the
device of the Opinion of the Court was used, and the spokesman
was quite frequently the Chief Justice himself. To a high degree
individual differences were submerged, and with Marshall's
smoothly flowing and highly persuasive legal style, his opinions
sounded not like the individual opinions of one man but like the
voice of the law. Speaking as such, he wrote the principles of
federalism into a vast body of constitutional interpretation even
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though Jeffersonian Republicanism constituted the prevailing po-
litical philosophy.
Chief Justice Marshall was able to entrench the Supreme Court
in a position of growing strength even through the process of self-
denial. In the famous 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,' for ex-
ample, he entrenched in constitutional law the principle of judicial
review of acts of Congress by striking down a provision of a statute
which gave power to the Court itself. Although he did it in such
a way as to enrage Jefferson and his admirers by reflections on the
legality of their acts, it was hard to find fundamental fault with a
decision that the Court could not exercise a power which Congress
had allocated to it but which the Constitution could be said not to
authorize.
It was characteristic of the work of the Marshall Court that it
curbed, in many directions, the exercise of power by the states and
asserted the existence of power in the federal government. This
usually took place in the area of private property rights. In a time
when gigantic corporate enterprise control is often exercised yet
largely divorced from ownership, and when among the rank and
file the use of a credit card is often prized more than evidence of
outright ownership, it is hard to comprehend the reverence in which
titles to property were held by conservative statesmen of our dis-
tant past. When movements were started in the states to curtail the
rights of property, the Marshall Court interpreted the Constitution
in such a way as to give protection to rights of property and curb the
powers of the states.
Marshall's firm leadership of the Supreme Court, during its
formative period, brought into our constitutional law the basic prin-
ciples of nationalism for the preservation of the rights of property
while leaving to the states vast areas of power for local government.
He operated with a fine capacity for statement of principle and for
persuading his brethren to accept his pattern of federalist ideas. He
rooted his opinions not merely in legalistic dogma but in a "public
philosophy." That philosophy, it is true, did not yield a body of uni-
versally accepted rules of law, but there was a degree of universal-
ity in the growing awareness of American nationhood, as well as
in the awareness that the prosperity of the future depended on liv-
ing up to well-recognized rules with respect to rights of property.
Marshall's contribution should be judged somewhat in terms of
the pattern of his opportunities. Two other Chief Justices, John
Jay and Oliver Ellsworth, had held the office before him, but they
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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had brought it little resembling the leadership which Marshall pro-
vided. It was Marshall, and not his predecessors, who had the vi-
sion, the persuasiveness, and the strategy, however, to make the
Court into a prime instrument of American federalism.
III. MR JUSTICE STORY AND THE TRANSITION
BETWEEN THE MARSHALL COURT AND THE TANEY COURT
For all that we may justly say, however, about the leadership of
Chief Justice Marshall in strengthening the nation and giving pro-
tection to property in the face of attempted encroachments by the
states, we must recognize the fact that the force of his leadership
was declining well before the time of his death in 1835. With re-
spect to national affairs, the balance of public sentiment was chang-
ing as new states were admitted west of the Appalachians and the
institution of slavery in the South became more and more a critical
issue. Jacksonian Democracy marked a welling up of the power of
the West to compete with the eastern seaboard from which all pre-
Jacksonian presidents had come. It marked resentment at control of
the country by eastern capital and demanded relaxation of the bonds
of governmental control from Washington.
It was during the 1830's and during the Jackson administration
that the Bank of the United States was overthrown, to the detriment
of centralized financial control of the country. It was then and there-
after, in the midst of expansion of credit through local banking insti-
tutions, that the states attempted to restrict the right of those insti-
tutions as well, oftentimes in violation of the contracts in their char-
ters. In short, it was a period of growing resistance to control,
whether in some sense by the dead hand of the past or by the cur-
rent institutions of government. Except in the matter of South
Carolina's attempted resistance to the tariff, the period did not mark
outright rebellion against the power of the federal government.
That was to come later.
The period which brought these changes in public sentiment
brought also a successor to Chief Justice Marshall and the appoint-
ment of still other new members to the Supreme Court. The new
Chief Justice, Roger B. Taney, of Maryland, had been one of the
prime instruments of the Jackson administration in doing away
with the Bank of the United States. Although a Federalist in his
youth, he had become an ardent Jacksonian and could be expected
to interpret the Constitution in terms of Jacksonian principles. The
leading Whigs of the country seem to have expected abandonment
of the rule of law in the Supreme Court and the use of the Court
as a bare-faced instrument of Democratic politics.
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While there was reason for expecting a gradual change in the
trend of decisions, there were also reasons for expecting that the
change would not be cataclysmic. Of these latter reasons, a lesser
one, but one nevertheless important, was the continuation on the
Court of men who had sat with Chief Justice Marshall and who
were steeped in the Marshall tradition. By far the most outstanding
of these was Justice Joseph Story, who, since his appointment to
the Court in 1811, had been Marshall's close companion and friend.
In addition to serving on the Court, Justice Story had taught law at
Harvard University and had incorporated the principles of Mar-
shall's great constitutional decisions into a three-volume work of
Commentaries on the Constitution. For his published commentaries
in other fields of law he had, or was building at the time of the
Taney appointment, a fine international reputation. Colleagues
even far less sensitive than the new Chief Justice would have hesi-
tated in the presence and under the critical eye of Justice Story
to have abandoned abruptly the course of settled decisions.
It is, of course, true that in dissenting opinions at the first term
of the Taney Court, Justice Story voiced lamentations at the pass-
ing of the old order and implied distortion by the Court of the
correct line of constitutional interpretation in cases of major
importance dealing with contracts, commerce, and currency. He
called up the voice of the deceased Chief Justice to prove his
point. In letters to, and conversations with, his friends he por-
trayed himself as the last living member of a dying club. He
predicted that not again in the foreseeable future would an act
of Congress or of a state legislature be held unconstitutional-as
if striking down statutes from time to time was essential therapy
for the body politic-and he talked much of resigning from the
Court. But for all his distress and despair, he remained a member
of the Court until his death in 1845, and Chief Justice Taney, as well
as some other members of the Court, seem to have leaned heavily
upon him as a man of wisdom and learning in the law.
Probably even more important than the influence of Justice
Story and other older members in preserving the continuity of
constitutional decisions was the fact that the new justices were also
steeped in the traditions of the law. For all the criticisms that
Democrats, including some of the new justices themselves, had
poured upon the judiciary of the Marshall period, they, as justices,
coveted the respect which the bar and much of the public normally
gave to the courts. Beyond that, it seems not too much to say that
they wished to be worthy of that respect. They knew that to be
worthy of it they had to hand down decisions in terms of law and
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not merely of politics; they had no desire to break continuity with
the line of past decisions.
IV. THE TANEY COURT
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL'
RIGHTS OF CORPORATIONS
While the new justices accepted the decisions of the Marshall
Court as valid for what they actually decided, they refused to ex-
tend Marshall's principles beyond the holdings of those previous
cases. It is interesting to note the manner in which the Taney
Court marked the end of trends characteristic of the Marshall
Court. In the Dartmouth College case,2 decided in 1819, the Marshall
Court had held that the charter of a private corporation consti-
tuted a contract which a state was forbidden by the Constitution
to impair. In the Charles River Bridge case,3 the Taney Court ac-
cepted that decision without question, but it refused to follow the
argument of Daniel Webster, who was of counsel in both cases, to
the point of holding that charters were to be construed broadly to
give the maximum power to the corporation created by the charter.
Instead, said Chief Justice Taney, the rights given were to be con-
strued narrowly. "While the rights of property are sacredly
guarded," the Chief Justice explained, "we must not forget that
the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well
being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation. ' 4 In
other words, would-be incorporators were still free to seek broad
grants from the state and to have those grants protected by the
Contract Clause of the Constitution, even if public attitudes toward
the grants might later change to the point of conviction that the
original grant had been made in error. The people were perma-
nently committed by the acts of their legislatures when those acts
constituted contracts. The Supreme Court would not, however,
compound the error of the legislature by reading into a grant more
than was clearly given. In interpreting charters it would look to
the rights of the people at large as well as to those of the corpora-
tion. The emphasis, protested in a sharp dissenting opinion by
Justice Story, marked an important change from the attitude of the
Marshall Court.
2 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
3 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
4 Id. at 548.
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In the interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the Taney Court
refused to go beyond previously decided cases in limiting the power
of the states to act upon interstate and foreign commerce. In the
great steamboat case of 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden,5 the Marshall Court
had held unconstitutional a state commercial regulation which was
in conflict with an act of Congress under which steamboats were
licensed for the coasting trade. Chief Justice Marshall had indi-
cated the persuasiveness of Daniel Webster's argument that the
very existence of the federal commerce power debarred state regu-
lation of interstate and foreign commerce whether or not Congress
had passed a regulatory measure; but, since a federal licensing
measure was involved in the Gibbons case, it was not necessary
there to say what the Court would have done if there had been no
such measure. Justices Story, McLean, and Wayne took the posi-
tion on the Taney Court that states could not in any event regulate
interstate and foreign commerce as such, but the majority of the
Court were unwilling to close the door on state regulation unless
Congress had seen fit to exercise its powers. The majority, in other
words, tried to preserve a kind of balanced federalism, with com-
merce powers taken away from the states only as Congress saw fit
to exercise those powers. Eventually, in 1852, the Court worked
out sort of a compromise, holding that some aspects of interstate
commerce could be regulated by the states while others could not
be regulated even if Congress had taken no action. State rights
were to a limited extent preserved until Congress saw fit to take
over, in spite of the absolutist nationalism that had stemmed from
the Marshall Court.
For all its limitation of the extremist trends of the Marshall
Court, however, the Taney Court quickly achieved respectability
with the rank and file of both the public and the Bar. It was op-
erating in a new era and in the face of new problems, and it came
to be taken for what it was and not merely as a deviant from the
Marshall Court.
B. LEGISLATIVE ATTACKS ON
CORPORATE CHARTERS
One of the Court's major tasks continued to be that of defin-
ing the constitutional rights of corporations in the face of an am-
bivalent attitude of the people, and of the state governments which
created them, toward corporations. It must be remembered that
the Taney period was a get-rich-quick period in which adventurous
522 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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people hoped to garner wealth by creating corporations to build
and operate turnpikes, bridges, canals, railroads, and other facilities,
to carry on trade, and to operate banks. Some got rich, but many
did not. Without an adequate body of law to protect corporations,
and an equally-needed body of law to protect the people against
their creatures, a great deal of ugly activity took place. Whether
with or without corrupt methods, incorporators lobbied success-
fully for charters which gave them broad corporate rights. The
people at large woke up to the fact that legislatures had given
rights that ought not to have been given. Taxpayers stormed par-
ticularly over tax exemptions granted to corporations at times when
the tax burden was cruelly felt. New legislatures, under popular
pressure, sought to revoke these exemptions and ran into the pro-
hibition of the Contract Clause which the Supreme Court had to
enforce. This gave the impression that the Court was the special
friend of corporations and the enemy of the sovereign states. The
Court was often blamed in situations wherein the fault lay not with
the Court but with the legislatures, which, corrupt or not, had made
the initial grants. In such situations, the Court began to build the




In certain cases, the entire federal court system, and not merely
the Supreme Court, came to be regarded as the friend of private
corporations and the enemy, or at least a potent rival, of the state
courts. These were cases which were tried in federal courts rather
than state courts, not because federal law was involved, but be-
cause the parties were citizens of different states. The framers of
the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 had sensed the pos-
sibility that a citizen of a distant state might not receive adequate
justice in a state court where judges could be subjected to local
prejudice and influence. They had therefore provided that suits
between citizens of different states might be brought in, or trans-
ferred to, federal courts where judges were appointed for life from
the nation's capitol.
The difficulty with respect to suits involving corporations lay
in the question whether a corporation, in a sense which would per-
mit federal courts to take jurisdiction in cases involving diversity
of citizenship, could be a citizen of a state. For many years the
Court took the position that a corporation could not itself be a cit-
izen, and that federal courts could take jurisdiction only in cases
wherein the stockholders of a corporation were citizens of a state
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other than that of the opposing party. But as stock ownership spread
more and more widely throughout the states it became more diffi-
cult to be sure of the complete diversity of citizenship that was
necessary for federal jurisdiction. Then, in Louisville, C. & C. R. R.
v. Letson,6 decided in 1844, the Supreme Court abandoned the re-
quirement that all stockholders be citizens of a state other than
that of the opposing party, and held that a corporation could be
treated as a citizen of the state in which it was incorporated and
operated its principal place of business.
This decision, which threatened to give to corporations not
merely the right to sue in federal courts, but also all other rights
of citizenship under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, brought
criticism from members of the Court, friends of state rights, and
enemies of corporate enterprise. Ten years later the Court again
shifted its ground. In Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R.,7 the Court
held that, while a corporation could not itself be a citizen, its rights
to sue or be sued in a federal court depended upon the citizenship
of the people who composed it, and then adopted the enormous
fiction that all component shareholders were citizens of the state
wherein the corporation was formed, and refused to admit any
evidence to the contrary. Thus, by fiction, the right to sue and be
sued in the federal courts was preserved without involving other
rights of citizenship. By and large, this resort to legal fiction in-
creased the power of the federal government at the expense of
that of the states, gave added protection to corporate enterprise,
and supported the idea of the sanctity of private property. It
marked an increase in the centralization of power in our federal
system, along with the involvement of many factors other than
that of centralization alone.8
D. CENTRALIZATION, SLAVERY,
AND REGIONAL CONFLICT
During the Taney period, factors other than those specifically
involving corporations pointed toward centralization of power in
the federal government. These factors included the increase in
interstate and international business, and that involved jurisdiction
643 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
757 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (18,54).
s Its further extension was to come in the post-Civil War period with the
classification of corporations as "persons" whose liberty and property
could not be taken without due process of law, and the preservation of
whose rights as against the states seemed to become the special concern
of the federal judiciary. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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beyond that of any one state. Included also was the admission of new
states, states which were newly settled and which had had no long
periods of development of local patriotism such as that found in
the original thirteen states. The newer states belonged more to the
Union by which they had been settled and erected into statehood
and had somewhat less sovereign identity than the original states
seemed to possess. But these unifying factors ran counter to a
disintegrating factor, the regional conflict over slavery, which
pretty much determined thought about the pattern of our federal
system until the outbreak of the Civil War.
Because the slavery issue was involved, the struggle between
centralization of power on the one hand and state rights on the
other led to a number of items which are significant even though
they may seem to mark obstructions to the forging of federalism
rather than evidence of its achievement. A unique item, for ex-
ample, was the opinion written by the nationalist Justice Story in
Prigg v. Pennsylvania9 in 1842. Pennsylvania had provided by
statute for the recapture of fugitive slaves found in the state and
had set up its machinery in such a way as to protect free Negroes
from southern raiders. But in this case, as in so many others, the
machinery was used to prevent the lawful recovery of slaves who
had fled from Maryland, whereupon the owner sent Edward Prigg
to recapture them without the aid of state officers. Prigg was in-
dicted for kidnapping, convicted, and the case was brought before
the Supreme Court.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Story held that the State of
Pennsylvania could not prevent the recapture of fugitive slaves and
that the judgment of conviction must be reversed. In so doing he
seemed to be giving way to the pro-slavery cause. But in writing
the opinion he went further to say that not only could a state not
interfere with the recapture of fugitive slaves, it could not par-
ticipate in such matters in any way, since the power over the re-
turn of fugitive slaves was exclusive in the federal government.
Justice Story seems to have persuaded some of the pro-slavery
justices on the Court that the exclusion of the states was necessary
to the effective protection of slavery interests. When he went back
to Boston at the end of the term, however, where he was among
friendly abolitionists, he seems to have boasted that he had struck
a blow for freedom in excluding the states from the recapture of
fugitive slaves. The abolitionist states took his broad hint and re-
pealed legislation permitting the use of their courts and their jails
941 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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in connection with the recovery of fugitive slaves. Since the Fugi-
tive Slave Act of 179310 had assumed the availability of state of-
ficers and state facilities, the Act was virtually nullified until enact-
ment of a new measure in 1850,11 the struggle over which further
deepened the rift between the North and the South.
Although Justice Story's opinion in the Prigg case may have
been a blow for freedom, it looks, from the historical point of view,
as if it marked one of those instances in which the Court created
more difficulties than it solved by going beyond the necessities
of the case at hand. Anti-slavery sentiment was not yet universal
enough to bring general acceptance of the holding; the result
was that the abolitionist states deepened the rift between them-
selves and the South. The Southern states were still strong enough
in Congress to secure legislation substituting federal machinery for
that of the states, and fugitive slaves benefited but little from the
temporary judicial interference in their behalf.
Likewise from the point of view of history, the Supreme Court
made a further mistake in the Dred Scott case 12 in 1857, though this
time the mistake was made on the opposite side. Here a case which
could have been decided in such a way as to deal with the fate of
only one Negro family was used as an instrument for pronouncing
that Congress had no power to exlude slavery from the territories-
the subject of a major regional conflict. In so using the case, it
seems clear that the motives of the majority of the Court were
eminently patriotic. They seem to have believed that the Union
could be saved only by the reduction of sectional strife, and that
that strife could be reduced only by repressing abolitionist agita-
tion. They believed that abolitionist agitation over slavery in the
territories could be terminated only by a pronouncement from the
Court that slavery could not be excluded. But here, as so often
happens, patriotism and soundness of prediction failed to coordi-
nate. Instead of giving up the controversy over slavery in the ter-
ritories, abolitionists, and others who would benefit thereby, made
the case a political issue, used it as an instrument to condemn the
Court and the Buchanan administration, brought about the election
of a Republican president, and precipitated the Civil War.
The Dred Scott case provided grounds for criticism not of the
patriotism but of the judgment of the majority of the Supreme
Court. This is not to imply that in matters of political judgment
10 Act of Febr. 12, 1793, c. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
"1 Act of Sept. 18, 1850, c. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
12 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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members of the Court should be expected always to be supremely
wise, but it is to imply that even in the very best sense of the term
they should not play politics with the judicial process unless they
have sound judgment as to outcome. In this instance, their judg-
ment proved to be wrong. In so appraising their performance in
the Dred Scott case it is not necessary to say whether they were
right or wrong in the interpretation of the power of Congress to
govern the territories. It is necessary only to note the fact that
the case could have been decided without discussion of the issue
at all, and indeed was initially scheduled to be so decided. Then
the intention of the minority to discuss the issue was disclosed,
and the majority felt that if the minority was to speak, they too
must have their say.
V. CONCLUSION
The implication that the personnel of the Taney Court were
primarily politicians rather than judges is not intended. Some of
them were far from outstanding, but there were able men among
them and it is doubtful that they were inferior to the membership
of the Court in most periods of our history. Indeed, in the Booth
cases,13 decided two years later and dealing with Wisconsin's nul-
lification of the fugitive slave law, the entire Court gave support
to an opinion by Chief Justice Taney which marks one of the finest
expositions of our federal system that exists anywhere in our judi-
cial history. But for the Dred Scott decision which lay behind it
and which drowned its voice in the storm of criticism, the Booth
decision might have done something to preserve clarity of thought
about federalism where slavery issues were involved. But by 1859
it was too late for effective appeals to cool heads and sound judg-
ment, if indeed we had not been faced with an irrepressible con-
flict from the beginning. That conflict was to be settled by force
and not by law. In such a settlement a judiciary has little place,
and it is therefore not surprising that for the period of the War,
and particularly with respect to the issues of federalism, the
Supreme Court slipped into the background.
In that War force of arms determined the meaning of the Con-
stitution as it then stood, and gave rise to amendments greatly
changing that instrument. Thereafter the Supreme Court, pri-
marily with newly appointed personnel, resumed the task of de-
lineating the pattern of American federalism-a federalism all the
more firmly established for the ordeal it had had to endure, and all
the more ready for delineation in terms of fundamental law.
18 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
